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\f0\fs24 \cf0 THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON\
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by Immanuel Kant\
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translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn\
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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION, 1781\
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Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to\
consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented\
by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every\
faculty of the mind.\
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It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It\
begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field\
of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same\
time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in\
obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more\
remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its\
labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease\
to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have\
recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while\
they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into\
confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence\
of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because\
the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience,\
cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless\
contests is called Metaphysic.\
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Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we\
take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as\
regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of\
honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and\
scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like\
Hecuba:\
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    Modo maxima rerum,\
    Tot generis, natisque potens...\
    Nunc trahor exul, inops.\
            -- Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii\
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At first, her government, under the administration of the\
dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative\
continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire\
gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of\
anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent\
habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time\
those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their\
number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely\
put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new\
edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times\
the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the\
legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the\
human understanding--that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found\
that--although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not\
refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience,\
a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims--as\
this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of\
her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into\
the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again\
became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to\
save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general\
persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness\
and complete indifferentism--the mother of chaos and night in the\
scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least\
the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science,\
when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill\
directed effort.\
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For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to\
such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.\
Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try\
to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by\
changes on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into\
metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to\
regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference,\
which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that\
kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is\
a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is\
plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgement*\
of the age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory\
knowledge, It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the\
most laborious of all tasks--that of self-examination, and to\
establish a tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims,\
while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions and\
pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own\
eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is nothing less than\
the critical investigation of pure reason.\
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[*Footnote: We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the\
present age, and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think\
that those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as mathematics,\
physical science, etc., in the least deserve this reproach, but that\
they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case,\
indeed, far surpass it. The same would be the case with the other\
kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established.\
In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally,\
severe criticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought.\
Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must be\
subjected. The sacredness of religion, and the authority of\
legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from the\
examination of this tribunal. But, if they on they are exempted,\
they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to\
sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood\
the test of a free and public examination.]\
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I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a\
critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the\
cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of\
experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding\
the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination\
of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science.\
All this must be done on the basis of principles.\
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This path--the only one now remaining--has been entered upon by\
me; and I flatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the\
cause of--and consequently the mode of removing--all the errors\
which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the\
sphere of non-empirical thought. I have not returned an evasive answer\
to the questions of reason, by alleging the inability and limitation\
of the faculties of the mind; I have, on the contrary, examined them\
completely in the light of principles, and, after having discovered\
the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell,\
have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. It is true, these\
questions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies and\
desires, had expected; for it can only be satisfied by the exercise\
of magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge. But neither do these\
come within the compass of our mental powers; and it was the duty of\
philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in\
misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may\
be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has been\
thoroughness; and I make bold to say that there is not a single\
metaphysical problem that does not find its solution, or at least\
the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity; and\
therefore, if the  principle presented by it prove to be insufficient\
for the solution of even a single one of those questions to which\
the very nature of reason gives birth, we must reject it, as we could\
not be perfectly certain of its sufficiency in the case of the others.\
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While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader\
signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears\
declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant; and yet they\
are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest\
author of the commonest philosophical programme, in which the\
dogmatist professes to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul, or\
the necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend\
human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I\
humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of\
any such attempt, I confine myself to the examination of reason alone\
and its pure thought; and I do not need to seek far for the\
sum-total of its cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind.\
Besides, common logic presents me with a complete and systematic\
catalogue of all the simple operations of reason; and it is my task\
to answer the question how far reason can go, without the material\
presented and the aid furnished by experience.\
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So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the\
execution of the present task. The aims set before us are not\
arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of\
cognition itself.\
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The above remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry. As\
regards the form, there are two indispensable conditions, which any\
one who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure\
reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are certitude and\
clearness.\
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As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this\
sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that\
everything which bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be\
excluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it is a necessary\
condition of every cognition that is to be established upon a priori\
grounds that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary; much more\
is this the case with an attempt to determine all pure a priori\
cognition, and to furnish the standard--and consequently an example--\
of all apodeictic (philosophical) certitude. Whether I have\
succeeded in what I professed to do, it is for the reader to\
determine; it is the author's business merely to adduce grounds and\
reasons, without determining what influence these ought to have on\
the mind of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may become\
the innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect\
which his arguments might otherwise produce--he may be allowed to\
point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty,\
although these do not concern the main purpose of the present work.\
He does this solely with the view of removing from the mind of the\
reader any doubts which might affect his judgement of the work as a\
whole, and in regard to its ultimate aim.\
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I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into\
the nature of the faculty which we call understanding, and at the same\
time for the determination of the rules and limits of its use, than\
those undertaken in the second chapter of the "Transcendental\
Analytic," under the title of "Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of\
the Understanding"; and they have also cost me by far the greatest\
labour--labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The\
view there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has\
two sides, The one relates to the objects of the pure understanding,\
and is intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the\
objective validity of its a priori conceptions; and it forms for\
this reason an essential part of the Critique. The other considers\
the pure understanding itself, its possibility and its powers of\
cognition--that is, from a subjective point of view; and, although\
this exposition is of great importance, it does not belong essentially\
to the main purpose of the work, because the grand question is what\
and how much can reason and understanding, apart from experience,\
cognize, and not, how is the faculty of thought itself possible? As\
the latter is an, inquiry into the cause of a given effect, and has\
thus in it some semblance of an hypothesis (although, as I shall\
show on another occasion, this is really not the fact), it would\
seem that, in the present instance, I had allowed myself to enounce\
a mere opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to\
hold a different opinion. But I beg to remind him that, if my\
subjective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of\
its certitude at which I aimed, the objective deduction, with which\
alone the present work is properly concerned, is in every respect\
satisfactory.\
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